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238 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
238 lines
7.6 KiB
Markdown
# Release Gating
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This document defines how the project should move from private work toward broader
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disclosure without creating an unacceptable blast radius.
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The aim is not perfect safety.
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The aim is to reduce both:
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- harm caused by negligent hesitation
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- harm caused by reckless release
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## Principle
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Release should move only as fast as the safety case, review capacity, and containment
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surface can move with it.
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If a capability can plausibly create misuse, destabilization, parasitic capture,
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catastrophic displacement, or irreversible social blast radius, it must not jump
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directly from private work to public unrestricted release.
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The working posture is:
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- plan for the worst credible interpretation
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- hope for the best real-world outcome
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- be pleasantly surprised when the worst case does not materialize
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This is meant to encourage resilient planning without turning the threat model into a
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claim of certainty.
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It also assumes that worldview inertia is normal.
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People will often reach for familiar explanations first, especially when a new result
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pressures old models of what is possible.
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That should be treated as an expected human response, not as a unique defect in the
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audience.
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For that reason, release pacing should be designed for human absorbability as well as
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for technical correctness.
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## Release Levels
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## `R0_PRIVATE`
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Default mode.
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Material remains private when any of the following are true:
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- the audit surface is not yet strong enough to distinguish truth from hype
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- the misuse path is clearer than the safety case
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- the disclosure would donate the platform edge before the platform exists
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- the social blast radius is unknown or obviously too large
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Allowed outputs:
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- internal notes
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- private experiments
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- simulation artifacts
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- locked architecture drafts
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## `R1_EXPERT_REVIEW`
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Bounded disclosure to a small number of qualified reviewers.
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Use this level when:
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- independent scrutiny is needed
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- public release would be premature
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- the material is ethically important enough that total silence would be negligent
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Requirements:
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- reviewers are chosen for competence and seriousness
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- disclosure is minimal for the review purpose
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- safety concerns, misuse concerns, and uncertainties are stated plainly
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- any high-risk detail remains constrained to the smallest useful surface
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- excessive excitement about disruptive change is treated as a review signal, not as a
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trust signal
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Allowed outputs:
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- redacted specs
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- audit contracts
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- ethical boundary notes
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- narrow technical packets needed for real critique
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Preferred reviewers are those who can remain:
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- curious without becoming euphoric
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- cautious without becoming frozen
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- serious about consequences without becoming theatrically apocalyptic
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## `R2_CONTROLLED_EXECUTION`
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Demonstration or validation under bounded conditions.
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Use this level when:
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- the executable path is deterministic
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- the audit surface is credible
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- outsiders need to see behavior rather than just read claims
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- unrestricted release would still be too dangerous
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Requirements:
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- execution environment is constrained
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- inputs and outputs are logged
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- undeclared side inputs are blocked
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- rollback, freeze, or kill-switch paths exist
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- observers can verify the declared contract without receiving the full internal edge
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Allowed outputs:
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- controlled demos
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- signed reports
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- bounded test vectors
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- replayable traces
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## Scoped Challenge Authorization
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One acceptable expert-review pattern is a one-time scoped challenge.
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In that pattern:
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- the reviewer chooses one target object
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- the authorization is bound to that exact scope
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- the authorization is time-bounded
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- reuse outside that scope fails verification
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If a challenge namespace is used, it should be explicit and narrow.
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For example, a fixed `archive.org` domain with a reviewer-chosen object path is a
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legible way to give the reviewer real choice without turning the token into a general
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license.
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The point of this challenge model is to demonstrate universality under reviewer-chosen
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conditions, not to showcase a hand-fit demo prepared around one secretly favorable
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file.
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## `R3_PUBLIC_SAFE_SURFACE`
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Broad public release of the parts that are safe enough to stand on their own.
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Use this level when:
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- the released surface is useful without revealing the most dangerous internals
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- misuse pathways are materially reduced by the bounded design
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- the public can verify reproducibility and honesty
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Allowed outputs:
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- deterministic VM spec
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- benchmark harnesses
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- build integrity manifests
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- validation tools
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- limited reference implementations
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## `R4_FULL_DISCLOSURE`
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Reserved for cases where:
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- the platform can survive disclosure
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- the safety case is substantially stronger
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- the misuse amplification from release is no longer dominant
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- governance and review are no longer bottlenecks
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This should be treated as a late-stage option, not the default moral baseline.
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For this project, the preferred durable public endpoint is not just broad availability,
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but archival publication as described in `ARCHIVAL_PUBLICATION_STRATEGY.md`.
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## Hard Stops
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Release must pause or fall back a level if any of the following appear:
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- memetic or parasitic uptake that outpaces understanding
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- evidence of destabilizing social interpretation
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- significant mismatch between public narrative and actual capability
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- clear path from released detail to catastrophic misuse
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- inability to audit whether the declared path was followed
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## Review Questions
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Before moving a capability upward, ask:
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- does this reduce preventable harm more than it increases misuse risk
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- does this help serious reviewers evaluate the work
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- can the released surface be independently checked
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- does the release create a social or economic shock larger than the review value
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- if this spread fast, would the world have enough interpretive and governance capacity
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- are we reacting to a credible risk model, or to unbounded fear
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- if the worst case does not happen, does this release plan still make sense
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If those answers are weak, the capability should stay gated.
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## Compression First
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Compression-oriented work is a preferred early release surface because it is:
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- technical
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- measurable
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- auditable
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- less immediately socially explosive than direct civilizational capability release
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That does not make it harmless.
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It means it is a calmer place to build trust, proof discipline, and review culture
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before disclosing more disruptive layers.
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It is also a better surface for readers and reviewers who need a bounded technical
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entry point before they can process larger worldview implications.
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## Target-Bound Reuse Principle
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If a future reuse or servicing platform is ever discussed or demonstrated, it must be
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target-bound by default.
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That means:
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- every operation is locked to an explicit authorized identity set
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- no autonomous spread outside declared targets is permitted
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- identity mismatch must fail closed
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- every touch must leave an auditable authorization trail
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The project should prefer bounded servicing tools over any design that could be
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interpreted as self-propagating, opportunistic, or ambiguously authorized behavior.
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## Scientific Gate Requirement
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Any proposal involving heritage spacecraft, orbital servicing, or probe augmentation
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must be gated behind real scientific and operational oversight.
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That means:
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- explicit review by qualified scientists and mission-relevant experts
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- explicit authorization from the relevant mission or institutional authority
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- bounded execution under a controlled protocol
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- no lone-operator deployment logic
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- no ambiguous claim of authority based on technical capability alone
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The intended model is disciplined scientific augmentation, not improvised private
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intervention.
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